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JONATHAN L. ENTIN*
S OME CASES never die. For example, debate about the Sam
Sheppard case, which was litigated for nearly half a century,
continues unabated.' Leo Frank was convicted of the brutal
murder of a thirteen-year-old girl following a tumultuous trial
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. E-
mail: jle@case.edu. Thanks to Michael Scharf for helpful comments and to
Andrew Dorchak, Judith Kaul, and Lisa Peters of the Case Western Reserve
University law library for help in locating obscure sources. The author assumes
full responsibility for all errors, omissions, and misjudgments.
I Sheppard was convicted of murdering his pregnant wife in 1954. See State v.
Sheppard, 128 N.E.2d 471 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955), affd, 135 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio
1956). In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court later overturned the conviction
on the basis of prejudicial publicity that contaminated the trial. See Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Sheppard was acquitted at his second trial and
died in 1970, and three decades later, his estate filed ail unsuccessful suit for
wrongful imprisonment. See Murray v. State, No. 78374, 2002 WL 337732 (Ohio
Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2002), appeal denied, 772 N.E.2d 1202 (Ohio 2002). On the
continuing debate about Sheppard's guilt, compare JACK P. DESARIO & WILLIAM
D. MASON, DR. SAM SHEPPARD ON TRIAL: THE PROSECUTORS AND THE MARILYN
SHEPPARD MURDER (2003), which contends that Sheppard murdered his wife,
with JAMES NEFF, THE WRONG MAN: THE FINAL VERDICT ON THE DR. SAM SHEPPARD
MURDER CASE (2001), which contends that Sheppard was innocent. See generally
PatriciaJ. Falk, Toward More Reliable Jury Verdicts?: Law, Technology, and Media Devel-
opments Since the Trials of Dr. Sam Sheppard, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (2001);
Jonathan L. Entin, Being the Government Means (Almost) Never Having to Say You're
Sony: The Sam Sheppard Case and the Meaning of Wrongful Imprisonment, 38 AKRON L.
REv. 139 (2005).
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before "a mob intent on death"2 and was later lynched after his
death sentence was commuted; that case also remains a source
of controversy.3 Similarly, the Sacco-Vanzetti case was an inter-
national cause cdlebre during the 1920s, generating a massive
body of literature, several plays, an Italian film featuring Joan
Baez singing "The Ballad of Sacco and Vanzetti" and a modern
re-enactment of the trial at the annual meeting of the American
Bar Association.4 Only a few years later came the Scottsboro
case, which produced several landmark Supreme Court rulings,
a television drama that prompted a high-profile lawsuit and a
continuing body of commentary.5 The more recent OJ. Simp-
son case might fit into this category, having provoked wide-
spread debate and generated books by many participants in the
events surrounding the case as well as by numerous
commentators.6
2 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 350 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3 The Georgia courts upheld Frank's conviction and denied his motions for a
new trial and to set aside the verdict. SeeFrank v. State, 80 S.E. 1016 (Ga. 1914);
Frank v. State, 83 S.E. 233 (Ga. 1914); Frank v. State, 83 S.E. 645 (Ga. 1914). The
Supreme Court, over a powerful dissent by Justice Holmes, denied habeas corpus
relief. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309. Although the Court rejected Frank's
claim, his case is widely viewed as a habeas landmark because the justices unani-
mously agreed that mob domination could support habeas relief in some circum-
stances. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REV. 441, 486-87 (1963); Eric M. Freedman, Mile-
stones in Habeas Corpus: Part II-Leo Frank Lives: Untangling the Historical Roots of
Meaningful Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467,
1532-34 (2000); see also EIc M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE
GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 86-87 (2001). On the continuing controversy about the
case, see STEVE ONEY, AND THE DEAD SHALL RISE: THE MURDER OF MARY PHAGAN
AND THE LYNCHING OF LEO FRANK 644-49 (2003). The Frank case inspired a vast
outpouring of books, an Emmy award-winning television miniseries, and at least
one novel. SeeJonathan L. Entin, Using Great Cases to Think About the Criminal
Justice System, 89J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1141, 1154 n.99 (1999) [hereinafter
Entin, Using Great Cases].
4 See Entin, Using Great Cases, supra note 3, at 1154 n.100.
5 The Supreme Court first ruled on the right to counsel. See Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). After the defendants were retried, the Court issued
major rulings on racial discrimination in jury selection. See Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935). On the litiga-
tion arising from the television drama, see Street v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 512 F. Supp.
398 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), affjd, 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981). For representative
analysis and commentary, see, for example, DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAG-
EDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969), and JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCor-
SBORO (1994).
6 For a selected bibliography, see Entin, Using Great Cases, supra note 3, at 1141-
42 nn.1-7,
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Another case that cannot die is the Billy Mitchell affair.7 The
conventional story line goes as follows. The legendary leader of
the American air service during World War I afterward got cross-
wise with the brass, whom he regarded as hidebound and my-
opic for ignoring his visionary ideas about the revolutionary
potential of air power and his prescient warnings of a Japanese
attack on Hawaii two decades before Pearl Harbor. For his ef-
frontery he was court-martialed and forced to resign from the
service, leaving the military unprepared for modern warfare and
the nation vulnerable to emerging enemies. In the aftermath of
September 11, the worst strikes on American territory since
Pearl Harbor, renewed interest in the Mitchell story should
come as no surprise. Two new books on the subject have ap-
peared in the last three years. The latest, by journalist Douglas
Waller, provides a riveting account of the court-martial as well as
many new details about Mitchell's personal life offered as inter-
mezzi during the chronicle of the legal proceedings.' Unlike
many earlier works, Waller offers an ambivalent portrait of his
protagonist as both a "visionary" and an "opportunist" before
concluding that, whichever description might be more accurate,
at least "[h]e had the courage of his convictions."9
Waller, like his predecessors, has largely ignored two fascinat-
ing legal issues. One concerns the First Amendment defense
that Mitchell raised at his court-martial: that he was being pros-
ecuted for disagreeing with his superiors. The other relates to
Mitchell's ideas about the use of air power, which emphasized
attacks on enemy industrial, agricultural and population centers
that raised important legal and moral questions. At the same
time, Waller chronicles, apparently for the first time, Mitchell's
ambiguous role as both propagandist and prosecution witness in
7 The William Mitchell involved in this controversy should not be confused
with the distinguished nineteenth century jurist who served for two decades on
the Supreme Court of Minnesota and for whom a St. Paul law school is named, see
Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Creativity of the Common-Law Judge: The Jurisprudence of Wil-
liam Mitchell, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 213 (2003), or his son, who served as
Solicitor General under President Coolidge and Attorney General under Presi-
dent Hoover, see William De Witt Mitchell Dead; U.S. Attorney General for Hoover, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1955, at 23.
s DOUGLAS WALLER, A QUESTION OF LOYALTY: GEN. BILLY MITCHELL AND THE
COURT-MARTIAL THAT GRIPPED THE NATION (2004).
9 Id. at 364. This view is considerably more positive than that of the other
recent Mitchell biographer, who described Mitchell's crusade for an indepen-
dent air service as "a power grab" and described the man as "not a good soldier"
who "never really comprehended the development of the aircraft carrier." JAMES
J. COOKE, BILLY MITCHELL 279-81 (2002).
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one of the NAACP's earliest criminal cases °.0 This essay ad-
dresses each of these topics and places the Mitchell affair in the
context of other celebrated conflicts involving American mili-
tary leaders.
I. MITCHELL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Mitchell was prosecuted under the so-called general article of
the rules of conduct applicable to members of the armed ser-
vices. This provision, which dates back to 1775, prohibits "all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and mili-
tary discipline."" The charges against him stemmed primarily
from a lengthy and intemperate written staterment that Mitchell
released to the press in September 1925 in the wake of the crash
of the Navy dirigible Shenandoah during a thunderstorm while
on a goodwill tour of midwestern state fairs.1 2 The statement
went well beyond the Shenandoah tragedy to encompass a litany
of other complaints about aviation policy that he had been
pressing for several years in published articles, congressional tes-
timony and internal policy deliberations. 3 He summed up his
10 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 343; infra part III.
11 This was the language of Article 96 of the Articles of War as revised shortly
before American entry into World War I, the version of the general article that
was in effect at the time of Mitchell's court-martial. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418,
§ 3, 39 Stat. 619, 666. This provision, with minor editorial revisions, was carried
over as Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See Act of May 5,
1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107, 142-43. The current version of Article 134, as trivially
amended in 1956, provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons
subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of
by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the dis-
cretion of that court.
Act of Aug. 10, 1956, 70A Stat. 76 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000)).
The general article was drawn from British law dating as far back as 1642. See
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 720 n.64 (2d ed. 1920). The
Continental Congress adopted the first American version as Article L of the
American Articles of War of 1775, see id. at 957, taken almost verbatim from Sec-
tion XX, Article III of the British Articles of War of 1765, see id. at 946. Analogous
provisions appeared as Section XVIII, Article 5 of the American Articles of War of
1776, see id. at 971, Article 99 of the American Articles of War of 1806, see id. at
985, and Article 62 of the American Articles of War of 1874, see id. at 991.
12 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 11-20.
13 See id. at 20-21. For a more detailed summary of Mitchell's statement, see
BuRKE DAVIS, THE BILLY MITCHELL AFFAIR 218-21 (1967).
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position by saying, "These incidents are the direct result of the
incompetency, criminal negligence and almost treasonable ad-
ministration of the national defense by the Navy and War
Departments." 4
At the outset of the proceedings, Mitchell's civilian lawyer ar-
gued that his client had simply expressed his views about mili-
tary preparedness, a right afforded to any citizen under the First
Amendment.15 The attorney did not press this argument very
vigorously, in part because it tended to undermine Mitchell's
desire to use the proceedings as a forum to present his views on
air power to a public audience.16 Indeed, most of the trial was
devoted to the defendant's effort to prove the truth of his
allegations. 17
Entirely apart from these strategic considerations, the deci-
sion not to pursue a First Amendment defense was surely correct
as a matter of legal doctrine. As of late 1925, when the court-
martial took place, the Supreme Court had taken an exceed-
ingly narrow view of freedom of speech. Barely six months ear-
lier, in upholding New York's criminal anarchy statute, the
Court observed that the judiciary should afford "great weight" to
a legislative determination that certain classes of speech were
too dangerous to be tolerated. 8 Of course, the general article
under which Mitchell was prosecuted did not focus on speech.
The Court remarked that when a general law was invoked
against speech, the matter should be resolved under the clear
14 WALLER, supra note 8, at 20. Mitchell issued his statement from Fort Sam
Houston, outside San Antonio, where he had been transferred after giving
sharply critical testimony before a congressional committee earlier in the year.
Id. at 7; DAVIS, supra note 13, at 199-207. The transfer also entailed a reduction in
rank, from the temporary status of brigadier general that he enjoyed as assistant
chief of the Army air service to his regular one of colonel. SeeWALLER, supra note
8, at 2.
15 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 85; see also DAVIS, supra note 13, at 243-44. The
lawyer, Congressman Frank Reid of Illinois, had gained Mitchell's admiration
during the congressional testimony that precipitated his transfer from Washing-
ton, D.C., to Texas. See WALLER, supra note 8, at 37; DAVIS, supra note 13, at 199-
200.
16 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 85. Some segments of the press also treated the
proceedings as a vehicle for disseminating Mitchell's views. See COOKE, supra note
9, at 194.
17 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 168-259. The court-martial never determined
whether truth constituted an absolute defense to the charges or could serve only
as a mitigating factor at the penalty stage of the proceedings. See id. at 183-84,
215, 260-61, 315.
I Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925).
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and present danger test that had been formulated and applied
in cases arising during World War .9
Unfortunately for Mitchell, the Court had never upheld a free
speech claim under the clear and present danger test. For ex-
ample, Schenck v. United States,2 ° the case that introduced the
test, unanimously upheld a conviction for distributing anti-con-
scription pamphlets to persons subject to the military draft. 21
Although it is far from clear that those pamphlets posed any real
danger to recruitment or to national security, more generally, 22
Justice Holmes emphasized that the First Amendment applied
with less force during wartime and that the pamphlets "cre-
ate[d] a clear and present danger that they [would] bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. 23
Moreover, a week later, the Court-without mentioning clear
and present danger-unanimously upheld the conviction of the
editor of a German-language newspaper for publishing antiwar
articles. 24 That same day, again without invoking clear and pre-
sent danger, the Court unanimously upheld the conviction of
Eugene Debs for making "a bold and provocative speech" op-
posing American involvement in the war.25 The opinion rebuf-
fed the First Amendment claim in less than one sentence. 26
Six months later, Justice Holmes, who had written all three of
these opinions, took a more protective approach to speech
rights. He did so, however, in a famous dissent in Abrams v.
United States27 that is celebrated for his thesis that "the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
19 Id. at 671.
20 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
21 Id. at 49, 53.
22 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME-FROM
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 214-15 (2004).
23 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. As in Frank v. Mangum, the Court's opinion con-
tained the seeds of a more expansive approach to individual rights. See supra
note 3. Schenck suggested that, contrary to hints in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907), the First Amendment might forbid restrictions on speech and
the press other than prior restraints. See Schenck, 247 U.S. at 51-52. Of course, as
in Frank v. Mangum, this suggestion did not help the claimant asserting a constitu-
tional violation.
24 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
25 STONE, supra note 22, at 196.
26 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (noting that one of Debs'
defenses was "based upon the First Amendment to the Constitution, disposed of
in Schenck v. United States").
27 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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competition of the market. '2 Although he was joined by Justice
Brandeis, 29 his other seven colleagues voted to uphold the con-
victions of five immigrants for distributing leaflets opposing
American intervention against the Russian revolution. The ma-
jority required an entire sentence to reject the First Amendment
argument in that case.3
These cases, particularly Schenck and Abrams, are well known.
Less famous are several other decisions during this period. For
example, Schaefer v. United States3" upheld the conviction of two
officials of a German-language newspaper for publishing false
reports about the war. 2 The paper's "[cloarse" and "vulgar"
statements served a "sinister purpose" and therefore enjoyed no
constitutional protection.3" Pierce v. United States 4 upheld the
convictions of members of the Socialist Party who distributed an
antiwar pamphlet called "The Price We Pay," which denounced
the war as a hypocritical undertaking for the benefit of J.P. Mor-
gan and other plutocrats rather than as a means for securing
democracy abroad. 5 The Court found it to be a matter of
"[c] ommon knowledge" that many of the pamphlet's statements
were grossly false."3 6 Gilbert v. Minnesota" upheld the convic-
tion of an official of the Nonpartisan League for violating a state
law that proscribed efforts to obstruct recruitment to the armed
services. The Court reasoned that "every word that [the defen-
dant] uttered . . . was false, was deliberate misrepresentation of
the motives which impelled [the war], and the objects for which
it was prosecuted.... It would be a travesty on the constitutional
28 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 631.
30 Id. at 619 ("This [First Amendment] contention is sufficiently discussed and
is definitely negatived in [Schenck and Frohwerk]."). For a detailed account of this
case and its aftermath, sec RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE AB.RAMS
CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1987).
31 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
32 The Court found insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions of two
other defendants. Id. at 471.
33 Id. at 478-79. Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented from the affirmance
of the two convictions because they found no clear and present danger to the
country. Id. at 482-83 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., dissenting).
34 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
'5 Id. at 245-47 (quoting extended excerpts from the pamphlet); id. at 256-63
(Brandeis,J., dissenting) (quoting the entire pamphlet).
"6 Id. at 251. Again, Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented largely on the
basis of the lack of a clear and present danger. Id. at 272-73 (Brandeis, J., joined
by Holmes, J., dissenting).
37 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
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privilege he invokes to assign him its protection. 3 8 Finally,
United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson 9 upheld the revocation of second-class mailing privi-
leges to a newspaper that had strongly criticized American in-
volvement in the war, an administrative decision that
substantially increased the paper's postage costs and effectively
prevented its distribution.4 ° The criticisms might have been
"written more adroitly than the usual pro-German propaganda,"
but it was apparent that "the publisher of these articles was de-
liberately and persistently doing all in its power to deter its read-
ers from supporting the war in which our government was
engaged and to induce them to lend aid and comfort to its
enemies.""
This brief account makes clear that the state of the law at the
time of Mitchell's court-martial made a First Amendment de-
fense exceedingly unpromising. To be sure, there have been
significant doctrinal advances since 1925. Virtually all of these
early cases have been called into doubt by Brandenburg v. Ohio,4 2
which established a strongly protective standard for speech ad-
vocating the violation of law.4" Moreover, New York Times Co. v.
38 Id. at 333. Justice Brandeis objected to the broad sweep of the law, noting
that it was "in fact an act to prevent the teaching that the abolition of war is
possible" and applied at all times and in all places within the state. Id. at 334
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Moreover, the state law infringed the right to discuss
or debate national issues. Id. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
White agreed with the latter objection, arguing that the Minnesota statute was
preempted by federal law. Id. at 334 (White, C.J., dissenting). Justice Holmes
concurred in the result without opinion, id., apparently because the First Amend-
ment had not yet been held applicable to the states. See STONE, supra note 22, at
606 n.305. The Court did that in an almost offhand passage a few months before
the Mitchell court-martial. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
39 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
40 Id. at 408-09; id. at 417, 419-20 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 415. Again, Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented. They did not
believe that the Postmaster General had statutory authority to make the decision
that deprived the newspaper of its favorable postage rate. As Brandeis explained,
"adoption of the construction urged by the [government] would raise not only a
grave question, but a 'succession of constitutional doubts.'" Id. at 429 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (quoting Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407, 422 (1908)). Holmes
wrote that "it would take very strong language to convince me that Congress ever
intended to give such a practically despotic power to any one man." Id. at 437
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
42 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
43 Id. at 447 (holding that the government may not prohibit advocacy of law
violation "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
BILLY MITCHELL CASE
Sullivan44 established constitutional protections for critics of
government officials on the theory that "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. '4 5 Moreover,
Bond v. Floyd46 emphasized "the right . .. to dissent from na-
tional ... policy"47 and the need "to give freedom of expression
the breathing space it needs to survive. 48 Unfortunately for
Mitchell, however, New York Times did not provide absolute pro-
tection for all statements about public issues,4" and Bond dealt
with the power of a legislature to exclude an elected member on
the basis of controversial public statements.5 11 Mitchell was
neither the defendant in a defamation action nor an elected of-
ficial, so these cases at best would have provided analogical sup-
port for a First Amendment defense at the court-martial.
A different line of cases, dealing with the speech rights of
public employees, further indicates the problem Mitchell faced.
Pickering v. Board of Education51 articulated a balancing test for
such cases. When a public employee asserts a First Amendment
defense against an adverse job-related action, a court must "bal-
ance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the [government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees. 52
There is no doubt that Mitchell's statements about air power
and national defense addressed matters of public concern, 5 nor
44 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
45 Id. at 270.
4l 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
47 Id. at 132.
48 Id. at 136.
49 Instead of an absolute privilege, the Court endorsed the "actual malice"
rule: a public official could recover damages for defamation by showing that the
criticism had been made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard
for the truth. See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. Three justices in that case sup-
ported "an absolute, unconditional" First Amendment right to criticize public
officials. Id. at 293 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 298
(Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring in the result).
F1 See Bond, 385 U.S. at 118.
51 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
52 Id. at 568.
53 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-47 (1983). It might be that Mitch-
ell's references to the working conditions under which he and other airmen la-
bored, see WALLER, supra note 8, at 249; DAVIS, supra note 13, at 219, did not
involve matters of public concern. Cf Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 (observing that
statements about working conditions that do not seek to inform the public that
an agency is not properly discharging its responsibilities or that officials have
breached their public trust do not involve matters of public concern). Because
2005] 585
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was there uncertainty over what Mitchell had said.54 After all, he
had released a written statement to the press, and the statement
received widespread news coverage.
Nevertheless, Mitchell probably could not have prevailed
under the Pickering test. The Supreme Court has emphasized
that the time, place, manner, and context of public employee
speech carry great weight in the Pickering test.56 In Pickering it-
self, the Court emphasized the government's legitimate concern
for preserving "discipline by immediate superiors or harmony
among coworkers," as well as "close working relationships for
which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and
confidence are necessary to their proper functioning. '57 Senior
military officers, including his immediate superiors and col-
leagues, were outraged by Mitchell's public statements; so was
President Coolidge. 58  To make matters worse, even before
those statements, the Secretary of War had characterized Mitch-
ell's "whole course" of conduct as "so lawless, so contrary to the
building up of an efficient organization, so lacking in reasona-
ble team work, so indicative of a personal desire for publicity at
the expense of everyone with whom he is associated, that his
actions render him unfit for a high administrative position. 59
In short, Mitchell had burned so many bridges with his supervi-
sors and coworkers that the efficiency prong of the Pickering test
almost certainly would have outweighed the speech prong.60
Mitchell's First Amendment defense would have failed even if all of his state-
ments dealt with matters of public concern, see infra notes 56-60 and accompany-
ing text, it is unnecessary to resolve this question.
54 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 677-78 (1994) (plurality opinion) (stat-
ing that a public employer may take action against an employee on the basis of
what the employer reasonably believes the employee said even if the employee
actually said something different).
55 SeeWALLER, supra note 8, at 26. Although Waller does not mention it, Mitch-
ell released to the press "an even more inflammatory challenge" to the brass four
days after his original bombshell. DAvis, supra note 13, at 223. All eight specifica-
tions in the charges against Mitchell were based on these two written statements.
See id. at 247.
56 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
57 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570.
58 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 25-26, 30.
59 DAVIS, supra note 13, at 205.
60 As Dean Wigmore, a harsh critic of Mitchell, put it:
You cannot, as an honorable man, stay inside an organization and yet
be publicly damning it. Assuming that you honestly believe these
things, ... there is only one thing for a gentleman to do: Resign,
and then go to the public-but not till then.
586
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Mitchell's First Amendment defense would have foundered
for a more important reason. Pickering applies to civilian employ-
ees, but Mitchell was an Army officer. The Supreme Court up-
held the general article under which he was tried half a century
later in Parker v. Levy." That case involved a military physician
who publicly attacked the war in Vietnam, saying that he would
refuse to go to Southeast Asia and would discourage African
American troops from going because of racism at home, and
that he regarded the Green Berets as war criminals.12 The
Court rejected vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the
general article. In so doing, the majority emphasized that "the
military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civil-
ian society"' " and that military law necessarily differs from its
civilian counterpart." Those differences, especially the require-
ments of obedience and discipline,"5 afforded wide congres-
sional latitude to regulate the conduct of members of the armed
forces and called for correspondingly greater judicial deference
to the choices embodied in military rules." Applying this ap-
proach, the Court found that any vagueness in the general arti-
cle had been cured by authoritative military construction"7 and
that Dr. Levy could not attack the provision as overbroad be-
More than that: Not only must a gentleman do that, but no other
course could be tolerated by one's associates.
John H. Wigmore, The Mitchell Court-Martial, 20 ILL. L. REv. 487, 490 (1926) (em-
phasis in original).
Another modern line of public employment cases would not have helped
Mitchell, either. Those cases deal with political patronage and generally prohibit
consideration of political affiliation in hiring, promotion, transfer, and recall of
government workers. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990);
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). This
rule applies only to low-level positions, however. The Supreme Court has ex-
cepted from First Amendment protection most confidential and policy-making
jobs and other positions for which political affiliation is "an appropriate require-
ment for the effective performance of the public office involved." Branti, 445
U.S. at 518; see also Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64-65, 71 n.5; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367 (plural-
ity opinion); id., 427 U.S. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). Even
if one could make an analogy between patronage and the charges against Mitch-
ell, his high-level position fell within the exception identified in these cases.
6 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
62 Id. at 735-37. For a detailed account of the case, see Robert N. Strassfeld,
The Vietnam War on Trial: The Court-Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy, 1994 Wis. L. REv.
839.
11" Levy, 417 U.S. at 743.
64 See id. at 749-51.
(5 See id. at 758.
66 See id. at 756.
67 See id. at 754-56.
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cause his statements were "unprotected under the most expan-
sive notions of the First Amendment." 68
The Court's decision in Levy has received sharp criticism, in-
cluding an impassioned dissent by Justice Stewart.69 Academic
commentators have also faulted the "separate society" rationale
underlying the decision.7" Nevertheless, many of these critics
concede that the First Amendment might not apply as strongly
in the military context as it does in civilian life. They object pri-
marily to what they regard as excessive judicial deference in
cases like Levy.71 Yet one of those critics suggested that the First
Amendment should not have shielded Dr. Levy because his
statements undermined military discipline. 72 Not all of Mitch-
ell's statements were as strong as those that led to Levy's court-
martial, but his reference to "incompetency, criminal negli-
gence and almost treasonable administration of the national de-
fense" was similar in tone to Levy's war crimes charges.
Moreover, unlike Levy, who was an Army captain, Mitchell was a
high-ranking officer near the top of the chain of command.
That fact alone might have undermined his First Amendment
defense.
Indeed, modern advocates of speech rights for military per-
sonnel have also recognized the government's interest in limit-
ing expression by high-ranking officers. Those command
officers speak from positions of authority; the public, their sub-
ordinates and other nations might confuse their individual pro-
nouncements with official policy, which in turn could
- Id. at 761.
69 See id. at 774 (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) ("I
find it hard to imagine criminal statutes more patently unconstitutional than
these vague and uncertain articles ...."). Justice Stewart read his dissent from
the bench, leaving onlookers with no doubt about the depth of his feelings. See
Strassfeld, supra note 62, at 840 n.5.
70 See, e.g., Earl F. Martin, Separating United States Service Members from the Bill of
Rights, 54 SYRACUSE L. REv. 599, 624-25 (2004); Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist's Viet-
nam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law, 77 IND. L.J.
701, 744-48 (2002); John F. O'Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military
Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REv. 161, 232-33, 308 (2000); see also C. Thomas
Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other "Special
Contexts," 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 779, 809-13, 823-24 (1988); see generally Jonathan
Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (2002). For a more posi-
tive view of the "separate society" approach, see James M. Hirschhorn, The Sepa-
rate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L.
REV. 177 (1984).
71 See, e.g., Dienes, supra note 70, at 819, 824, 825-34.
72 See Mazur, supra note 70, at 742-43.
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undermine civilian control of the armed forces and provoke
diplomatic or military crises."3 Commentators who take this po-
sition do not favor completely muzzling the brass, but none have
suggested that Mitchell's court-martial violated his right to free-
dom of speech. 4
In the end, Mitchell did not press his First Amendment de-
fense because he viewed his trial in political terms, as an oppor-
tunity to make his case to the public rather than to his
superiors.75 For that reason, he did not allow his lawyer to make
a closing argument but instead closed his side of the court-mar-
tial with an unsworn personal statement.76 Had he pressed the
defense, however, the outcome would have been the same, even
if the case had arisen today.
II. MITCHELL, AIR POWER, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
More troubling than the casual discussion of the First Amend-
ment gambit, Waller presents only bits and snatches of Mitch-
ell's strategic vision of air power, and he never explains some of
the contemporaneous legal and moral concerns that gave some
skeptics pause about where Mitchell sought to take American
military policies. By organizing the book around the court-mar-
tial proceedings and using flashbacks to fill in earlier events,
Waller misses a chance to put an important aspect of the Mitch-
ell controversy into larger context. To be sure, the author out-
73 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amend-
ment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 346, 350 (1971); Detlev F. Vagts, Free Speech in
the Armed Forces, 57 CoLuNI. L. REV. 187, 189 (1957); Note, Prior Restraints in the
Military, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1089, 1116-17 (1973); but see Ronald N. Boyce, Freedom
of Speech and the Military, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 240, 254-56 (criticizing these ratio-
nales for restricting military speech).
74 In fact, these commentators recognize the benefits that can accrue from
some speech by top military officers. See, e.g., Vagts, supra note 73, at 190-91; Prior
Restraints, supra note 73, at 1117; see also John G. Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the
President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1697, 1752-53 (1968). For this reason, Professor Vagts specifically criti-
cizes the general article as "particularly poorly adapted" to addressing the prob-
lem and as "definitely unsuitable for dealing with an area where competing policy
factors require careful line-drawing." Vagts, supra note 73, at 213. At the same
time, he does not argue that Mitchell's constitutional rights were infringed by his
court-martial under the general article. See id. at 196-97; see also Kester, supra note
74, at 1740 n.261. Moreover, the critics of the Levy decision do not mention the
Mitchell court-martial. See supra note 70.
75 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
76 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 317-18. Mitchell had given sworn testimony
during the trial and had been devastatingly cross-examined by an Army lawyer.
See id. at 240-46, 248-52.
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lines some of Mitchell's predictions about the future of warfare
and is careful to include examples of where Mitchell erred as
well as where he accurately foretold modern developments.77
He also offers a brief account of Mitchell's skepticism about the
role of surface vessels, but that discussion occupies only a para-
graph or two of an extended account of a 1921 test in which
Mitchell's aviators sank the Ostfriesland, a German battleship that
had been regarded as invulnerable during World War 1.78 This
discussion is more illuminating about the Navy's visceral opposi-
tion to Mitchell's ideas than about the ideas themselves.
Perhaps the most useful window into Mitchell's thinking is
Winged Defense,79 which was published less than a month after his
September broadsides that led to the court-martial." As might
be expected of a work that the author described as a "thrown
together hastily,""1 the book has a rambling and repetitious
quality. Nevertheless, Winged Defense offers the most compre-
hensive public statement of Mitchell's vision of air power.8 2 It
drew heavily on Mitchell's earlier magazine and newspaper arti-
cles as well as some of his congressional testimony over the pre-
vious few years, and it was published roughly
contemporaneously with his trial.8 3
Mitchell argued that the rise of air power was revolutionizing
warfare. 4 Unless a nation controlled the air, neither its army
77 See id. at 5-6, 56-57.
78 See id. at 150; see generally id. at 142-55.
79 WILLIAM MITCHELL, WINGED DEFENSE: THE DEVELOPMENT AND POSSIBILITIES
OF MODERN AIR POWER-ECONOMIC AND MILITARY (1925).
80 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 7. Mitchell hoped that the book would be a
best-seller, see id. at 10, but sales were disappointing, see id. at 334.
81 MITCHELL, supra note 79, at viii.
82 Mitchell's 1923 manual on bombardment contained a more sophisticated
analysis, but that was never published. Instead, he distributed it privately to mem-
bers of the air service. ALFRED F. HURLEY, BILLY MITCHELL: CRUSADER FOR AIR
POWER 100 (1964).
83 See id. at 100.
84 MITCHELL, supra note 79, at vii-viii. Mitchell was not the only advocate of this
position. A number of European commentators, notably Giulio Douhet of Italy
and Hugh Trenchard and B.H. Liddell Hart of Great Britain, advanced similar
views. See HURLEY, supra note 82, at 76-79, 111; MICHAEL S. SHERRY, THE RISE OF
AMERICAN AIR POWER: THE CREATION OF ARMAGEDDON 23-28 (1987). Mitchell met
Douhet, who is regarded as the most original of the European writers, during a
1921-1922 foreign tour, but probably did not learn of the Italian's major book at
that time. See HURLEY, supra note 82, at 75. That work was not translated into
English until 1942, six years after Mitchell's death. See id. at 74-75; SHERRY, supra,
at 371 n.1; WALLER, supra note 8, at 350.
590
BILLY MITCHELL CASE
nor its navy could function effectively.8 5 He expressed particu-
lar skepticism about traditional naval strategy. Surface vessels
would become obsolete because even the most formidable bat-
tleships could not stand up to aircraft attacks.86 Indeed, that was
the lesson of the air service's sinking of the Ostfriesland and
other German vessels in a series of 1921 tests.87 Submarines, on
the other hand, might have a promising future, especially as de-
vices for transporting airplanes over great sea distances.88 Al-
though he had less to say about the army, Mitchell took a
similarly pessimistic view of its future. Traditional army func-
tions could not survive the emergence of military aviation, he
believed. An army might be able to hold and control land areas,
but it would no longer fight the crucial battles. 9 Instead, deci-
sive engagements-both offensive and defensive-would be
conducted by planes. 90 To illustrate the point, he cited British
reliance on aircraft in overseeing the occupation of Iraq follow-
ing World War V.' What really mattered was the army's hide-
bound, backward-looking approach that rendered its current
leadership "psychologically unfit" to adapt to the emerging reali-
ties of modern warfare. 92
Mitchell couched his argument in terms of national defense.
He argued that the rise of air power made the entire United
States vulnerable to attack.9" No longer would the oceans pro-
tect us from our adversaries because enemy planes could reach
anywhere in the country.94 Accordingly, America needed a
strong air force to repel hostile approaches. 5 But he did not
85 See MITCHELL, supra note 79, at xv, 122.
86 See id. at 18, 100-01, 110, 123, 133.
87 See id. at 56-76. Indeed, Mitchell entitled the chapter describing those tests
as "The United States Air Force Proves That Aircraft Dominate Seacraft." Id. at
56.
88 See id. at 18, 109, 123. Mitchell predicted that Japan would transport the
airplanes for its attack on Pearl Harbor by submarine; in fact, the Japanese used
aircraft carriers for that purpose in 1941. WALLER, supra note 8, at 57.
89 See MITCHELL, supra note 79, at 134-35.
90 See id. at 122.
91 See id. at 23.
92 See id. at 20-21; see also id. at 112, 159-61.
93 See id. at 11.
94 See id. at xi, xiii, 11.
95 See id. at 11. In fact, Mitchell contended that all countries would move to-
ward reliance on air power. An island nation that faced a continental opponent
would need to control the air approaches to its territory and strike at targets on
the opponent's territory. See id. at 10-11. A country on the mainland facing a
hostile neighbor also needed a powerful air force that could "la[y] waste" to the
opponent's infrastructure. See id. at 11. Although Mitchell did not name specific
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confine his discussion to purely defensive measures. He empha-
sized strategies for achieving military victory, suggesting that this
country would at some point fight another overseas war.96 To
defeat an enemy, this nation would have to carry the fight to the
adversary's territory, and aircraft would play a vital role in that
process. Moreover, reliance on air power would deter conflict
and make any future wars shorter, cheaper and more humane.97
Facing the specter of airplane attacks, Mitchell reasoned, "a
state will hesitate to go to war, or, having engaged in war, will
make the contest much sharper, more decisive, and more
quickly finished. This will result in a diminished loss of life and
treasure and will thus be a distinct benefit to civilization. 9 8
At least in theory, the new air war distinguished between mili-
tary and civilian targets. A careful reading of Winged Defense,
however, suggests that the distinction was more theoretical than
real. "Air forces," Mitchell wrote early in the book, "will attack
centers of production of all kinds, means of transportation, agri-
cultural areas, ports and shipping; not so much the people them-
selves."99 These included "manufacturing and food centers,
railways, bridges, canals and harbors."'100 Later he said, "To gain
a lasting victory in war, the hostile nation's power to make war
must be destroyed-this means the manufactories, the means of
communication, the food products, even the farms, the fuel and
oil and the places where people live and carry on their daily lives."' 1
These strong measures were necessary both to deprive opposing
military forces of needed supplies and also to demoralize the
citizenry of the opposing nation so that they would pressure
their leaders to sue for peace.10 2
These passages demonstrate the elusive distinction in Mitch-
ell's thinking between military and civilian targets. If every in-
dustrial plant, road, bridge, farm and residence is fair game for
bombing, then every person in the other nation becomes a tar-
countries, this discussion unmistakably alluded to the United Kingdom in the
former category and to France as well as a potentially rearmed Germany in the
latter. See HURLEY, supra note 82, at 74-75, 77; SHERRY, supra note 84, at 23.
96 See HuRLEY, supra note 82, at 92-93.
97 See MITCHELL, supra note 79, at xvi, 14, 16, 127.
98 Id. at 16.
99 Id. (emphasis added).
100 Id. at xvi.
101 Id. at 126-27 (emphasis added).
102 See id. at 14, 127.
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get either directly or indirectly.""3 Air war, in other words,
sounds like total war. That prospect raised disturbing legal and
moral questions.
The legal issues were especially vexing. Few binding rules that
specifically applied to air war existed when Mitchell wrote, and
those were originally written before the advent of powered
flight. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 had adopted a
declaration prohibiting "the launching of projectiles and explo-
sives from balloons, or by other new methods of similar na-
ture." 4 By its terms, this prohibition had a duration of only five
years.'0 5 The declaration was renewed in 1907 by the Second
Hague Peace Conference. 106 The renewal was also for a limited
term, to expire at the close of the projected Third Peace Confer-
ence.'0 7 Due to the outbreak of World War I, that conference
never took place. In any event, the prohibition "generally is re-
garded as having no legal significance."'" 8 Even if it retained its
vitality, this prohibition addressed a different problem than the
type of aerial warfare contemplated by Mitchell. The agreement
embodying the prohibition-which as its title made clear fo-
cused specifically on the use of balloons-was adopted four
years before and renewed four years after the Wright brothers'
initial flight at Kitty Hawk, a time when policymakers had no
real inkling that motorized airplanes had military uses.10 9
103 The ambiguity in Mitchell's thinking about the difference between military
and civilian targets is underscored by his references to attacks involving "gas," id.
at 5, and "[c]hemical weapons of all sorts," id. at 165, which are even more diffi-
cult to target precisely than are bombs.
104 Declaration to Prohibit for the Term of Five Years the Launching of Projec-
tiles and Explosives from Balloons, and Other New Methods of a Similar Nature,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839, 1 Bevans 270.
105 On the background to this agreement, see W. Hays Parks, Air Law and the
Law of War 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1990).
106 See Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives
from Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, 1 Bevans 739.
107 Id. at 2439.
108 Parks, sup-a note 105, at 17. As a practical matter, the declaration carried
little weight. By its terms, it bound only the ratifying parties, and only in the
event of a war involving those nations. Only the United Kingdom, which had
refused to subscribe to the original 1899 ban, and the United States ratified the
1907 renewal. France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia, parties to the original
agreement, declined to endorse the renewal. See id.
111 See Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy
, 
Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial
Precision Warfare, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431, 437 (2004). Balloons had been
used for military purposes on several occasions during the nineteenth century.
See James W. Garner, Some Questions of International Law in the European War, 9 AM.
J. INT'L L. 72, 93 (1915); Parks, supra note 105, at 10 n.38.
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Aside from the balloon declaration, other more general rules
might have provided some guidance about the legality of aerial
bombing. For example, the first Hague conference of 1899 en-
dorsed rules about land-based warfare (commonly referred to as
Convention 1)110 that the second conference of 1907 revised in
some particulars (commonly referred to as Convention IV)."'
Moreover, the 1907 conference also endorsed detailed regula-
tions about naval bombardment (commonly referred to as Con-
vention IX).112 The land and naval rules might have extended
by analogy to aerial warfare.
The relevant provisions of the land rules appeared in the An-
nex to Conventions II and IV. Specifically, Article 25 of Conven-
tion IV forbade "[t]he attack or bombardment, by whatever
means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are unde-
fended."1 3 The italicized language did not appear in Conven-
tion II, and that language might be taken to apply to aerial
bombardment." 4 In addition, Article 27 of the Annex to Con-
vention IV required that "all necessary steps" be taken "to spare"
buildings and places that were "not being used at the time for
military purposes. '
Similar restrictions appeared in the 1907 naval rules, Conven-
tion IX. For example, the very first substantive provision of
those rules forbade navies from bombarding "undefended
ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings."' 16 The next pro-
vision expanded the definition of permissible targets because it
110 See Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on LandJuly
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter Convention II].
111 See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 613 [hereinafter Convention IV].
112 See Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, 1 Bevans 681 [hereinafter Convention IX].
113 Annex to Convention IV, supra note 111, art. 25 (emphasis added).
114 The analogous provision of Convention II contained a couple of other mi-
nor linguistic differences from Convention V ("habitations" instead of "dwell-
ings" and "not defended" instead of "undefended"). Annex to Convention II,
supra note 110, art. XXV.
115 Annex to Convention IV, supra note 111, art. 27. This provision specifically
mentions "buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes,
historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are col-
lected." Id. The analogous provision of Convention II contains very slight lin-
guistic differences (providing that protective measures "should be taken" rather
than "must be taken") and does not specifically mention historic monuments. See
Annex to Convention II, supra note 110, art. XXVII. Both articles require that
the target government indicate the protected structures or locations by "particu-
lar and visible" (Convention IV) or "distinctive and visible" (Convention II) signs.
116 See Convention IX, supra note 112, art. 1.
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defined those targets in terms of their military significance
rather than their location in a defended place. According to
this provision, lawful targets included not only military facilities
and materiel, but also "workshops or plant[s] which could be
utilized for the needs" of hostile forces." 7 In other words, civil-
ian facilities that could benefit a nation's armed forces came
within this definition. All lawful targets were fair game, but the
attacking commander had to take "all the necessary measures"
to protect the buildings and places covered by Article 27 of the
Annex to Convention IV, "on the understanding that they are
not used at the same time for military purposes.""' The naval
rules also contained a "collateral damage" provision: a com-
mander could attack military targets after appropriate notice
and warning to local authorities; a commander who complied
with these requirements "incur[red] no responsibility for any
unavoidable damage which [might have been] caused by a bom-
bardment under such circumstances."' '9
These rules of land and naval warfare had potentially serious
implications for Mitchell's grand aerial strategy. First, Mitchell's
expansive definition of military targets might well have included
"undefended" towns. Although the Hague Conventions did not
define this crucial term (an omission that caused subsequent
confusion), in practice the armed forces of many nations under-
stood it to refer to a place that was "lacking military defenses
and open to physical occupation by the enemy."' 2" To the ex-
tent that Mitchell viewed an opponent's entire territory as sub-
ject to aerial attack, therefore, his strategy might entail unlawful
bombing of undefended locations.
At the same time, Convention IX's expansive definition of
lawful military targets, which included industrial and other facil-
ities with potential military uses, suggested that aerial attacks
could focus on the manufacturing and agricultural facilities that
Mitchell envisioned. Even so, aerial attacks still would have to
comply with the rules of naval bombardment embodied in Con-
vention IX. Those rules included notice to the adversary and a
reasonable time to dismantle or destroy the military targets. 21
If the adversary failed to respond appropriately within a reasona-
ble time, then aerial bombardment could proceed provided that
117 Id. art. 2.
118 Id. art. 5. For the list of protected places, see supra note 115.
19 Convention IX, supra note 112, art. 2 (emphasis added).
120 Parks, supra note 105, at 15.
121 See Convention IX, supra note 112, art. 3.
2005] 595
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the attack did not cause avoidable collateral damage. 122 It is not
entirely clear whether Mitchell had it in mind to comply with all
these requirements. At the same time, to the extent that he ad-
vocated something less than "indiscriminate bombing," his strat-
egy might have come within the strictures of Conventions IV
and IX.' 23 To the extent that he contemplated attacks on resi-
dences and other civilian places-"the places where people live
and carry on their daily lives"124 -his approach would have run
afoul of these provisions.
Although there might be some uncertainty about the consis-
tency of Mitchell's approach with the 1899 and 1907 rules for
land and naval warfare, it is clear that his ideas would not have
comported with rules of aerial warfare that were proposed by
the Hague Commission of Jurists in 1923.125 The proposed
Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare imposed stringent restrictions on
air attacks. For example, Article 22 forbade such attacks "for the
purpose of terrorizing the civilian population [or] of destroying
or damaging private property not of military character. "126
Moreover, Article 24 strictly limited the definition of permissible
targets and imposed greater responsibility for collateral damage
on attackers. Lawful targets under these rules included, in addi-
tion to military personnel and facilities, "factories constituting
important and well-known centres engaged in the manufacture of arms,
ammunition or distinctively military supplies" as well as transport
and communications media "used for military purposes. "127
Even when the target fell within this more stringent definition,
the rules forbade an attack if the target was "so situated, that [it
could not] be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombard-
ment of the civilian population, "128
The Hague Rules posed formidable obstacles to Mitchell's
strategic vision. First, the ban on bombing for the purpose of
122 See id. art. 5.
123 Parks, supra note 105, at 20.
124 MITCHELL, supra note 79, at 127; see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
125 For the text of these rules, see General Report of the Commission ofJurists at The
Hague, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 245-60 (Supp. 1923) [hereinafter Hague Rules of
Aerial Warfare]. The rules, together with official comments, were reprinted on
the eve of World War II. See Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report upon the
Revision of the Rules of Warfare, General Report, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-56 (Supp.
1938) [hereinafter Revision of Rules of Warfare].
126 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, supra note 125, art. 22.
127 Id. art. 24(2) (emphasis added); Revision of Rules of Warfare, supra note 125,
art. 24(2).
128 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, supra note 125, art. 24(3).
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terrorizing civilians ran counter to his idea that aerial attacks
would frighten an adversary's population into surrender.' 21 Per-
haps Mitchell would have opposed the idea of bombing for its
own sake but contemplated, as did other strategists around the
world, that an attack on a military target that incidentally
crushed civilian morale was entirely appropriate. 3" These rules
required that the exclusive purpose of bombing be to attack mil-
itary targets." '
Second, the restrictive definition of permissible targets as en-
compassing only those known to be actually engaged in military
support would have forbidden attacks on "centers of production
of all kinds, means of transportation, agricultural areas, ports
and shipping" '' l as well as on "the manufactories, the means of
communication, the food products, even the farms, the fuel and
oil."' 3 Many of Mitchell's suggested targets had only military
potential, which made them off limits to aerial bombardment
under the Hague Rules.
Third, unlike Convention IX, these rules placed responsibility
for collateral damage primarily on the attacker.'3 4 This meant
that if an adversary placed military targets in or close to civilian
areas, aerial bombardment could not proceed unless "indiscrim-
inate bombing of the civilian population" could be avoided. 35
This difficulty was compounded by two additional factors: the
Hague Rules did not define "indiscriminate bombing," and the
accuracy of aerial bombing at the time left much to be
desired. 36
Whether Mitchell would have run afoul of the Hague Rules
remains a purely hypothetical matter because those rules were
129 See MITCHELL, supra note 79, at 127; see supra note 101 and accompanying
text.
1311 See Parks, supra note 105, at 32.
131 See Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, supra note 125, art. 24(2); Revision of
Rules of Warfare, supra note 125, art. 24(2).
132 MITCHELL, supra note 79, at 16; see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
13 MITCHELL, supra note 75, at 126-27; see supra note 101 and accompanying
text.
134 See Convention IX, supra note 112, art. 2; see also supra note 119 and accom-
panying text.
135 See Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, supra note 125, art. 24(3); Revision of
Rules of Warfare, supra note 125, art. 24(3).
1 6 Although Mitchell and his supporters made much of the air service's sink-
ing of the Ostfriesland and complained about the restrictive ground rules for the
test, see WALLER, supra note 8, at 145-46, questions persisted about the accuracy of
the bombing in light of the relative helplessness of the vessel. See Canestaro,
supra note 109, at 441 n.55.
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not ratified by any country.1"7 On the other hand, Mitchell's
approach almost certainly would have violated the most recent
international rules about aerial warfare, Protocol I to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949.138 Those rules represent the first at-
tempt since the 1923 Hague proposals to codify the law of aerial
warfare. 13 9 The United States has not ratified Protocol I, prima-
rily because of objections to provisions that address matters un-
related to aerial warfare, but has indicated that some of its
"positive provisions" might reflect customary international
law. 140 State Department officials have said that this country will
follow Protocol I's provisions "to the extent that they reflect cus-
tomary international law, either now or as it may develop in the
future,"'1 41 and this country has done so in both the Persian Gulf
and the Balkans. 142
Several of Mitchell's ideas about aerial warfare were in tension
with Protocol I. For example, Mitchell believed that air attacks
directed at demoralizing civilians would be an effective means of
defeating an enemy, 43 but Article 51 specifically prohibits ac-
tions having "the primary purpose of . . . spread[ing] terror
among the civilian population.1 44 Similarly, he favored attacks
137 See Parks, supra note 105, at 31.
138 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, arts. 48-60, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 25-31, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1412-18 [hereinafter
Protocol I].
139 See Canestaro, supra hote 109, at 440; Parks, supra 105, at 35.
140 Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, 1 PUB. PAPERS 88, 89 (Jan. 29, 1987). In this statement President Reagan
explained that he would not ask for Senate ratification of Protocol I because its
provisions relating to wars of national liberation were "fundamentally and irrec-
oncilably flawed." Id. at 88. State Department officials also cited problems with
some of the provisions relating to aerial warfare but took the position that others
did reflect customary international law or embodied principles that should even-
tually become part of customary international law. See Michael J. Matheson, The
United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Proto-
cols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 421,
426-27 (1987); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Position of the United States on Current Law
of War Agreements, 2 Am. U. L.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 460, 468-69, 471 (1987). For a
detailed critique of Protocol I's aerial-warfare provisions, see Parks, supra note
105, at 112-224.
141 Matheson, supra note 140, at 420.
142 See Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party
States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2001, at 67,
94.
143 See MITCHELL, supra note 79, at 14, 127; see also supra note 102 and accompa-
nying text.
144 Protocol I, supra note 138, art. 51(2).
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on "agricultural areas," 4 5 "food centers,""' and "food products,
even ... farms,"' 47 but Article 54 explicitly proscribes attacks on
"objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,
such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-
stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies
... for the specific purpose of denying them for their suste-
nance value to the civilian population ... , whatever the motive,
whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move
away, or for any other motive.""14
In addition, Mitchell advocated bombing industrial, commu-
nication and transportation facilities, 4 9 but that approach con-
travenes several provisions of Protocol I. Article 52 limits
permissible targets to "those objects which by their nature, loca-
tion, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutral-
ization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage."'5 °1 Even if factories, highways, bridges, or
ports might fit within this definition-and Protocol I provides
that if there is any doubt about whether a facility "is being used
to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be
presumed not to be so used"' 5 '-such attacks run the risk of
killing or injuring civilians, who are protected under Article 51
"unless or for such time as they take a direct part in hostili-
ties. 1 52 Faced with the prospect of civilian casualties, a bombing
commander under Article 57 must "refrain from deciding to
launch any attack which may be expected to cause [collateral
damage] which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated. 151
It is not really fair to tax Mitchell for promoting ideas that
contravened controversial rules that were not drafted for an-
other half-century after he wrote (Protocol I) or that never took
formal effect (the 1923 Hague Rules), but this discussion at least
suggests why some of his views might have seemed somewhat
problematic. Whatever significance should attach to Protocol I
145 MITCHELL, supra note 79, at 16; see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
146 MITCHELL, supra note 79, at xvi; see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
147 MITCHELL, supra note 79, at 127; see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
148 Protocol I, supra note 138, art. 54(2).
149 See MITCHELL, supra note 79, at xvi, 16, 126-27; see also supra notes 99-101
and accompanying text.
150 Protocol I, supra note 138, art. 52(2).
151 Id. art. 52(3).
152 Id. art. 51(3).
153 Id. art. 57(2) (a) (iii).
2005] 599
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
or the Hague Rules, the military officials who made American
air policy during the 1920's took a somewhat different course
than Mitchell advocated. This cannot be explained by hostility
to Mitchell, because the officers responsible for the policies had
worked closely with him during World War I and until his court-
martial."' a The 1925-1926 bombing text that they produced for
the Air Corps Tactical School rejected the "'morale-centered'
approach" endorsed by Mitchell in favor of the "industrial web
theory" of bombing.1 55 Although the latter strategy itself re-
sulted in substantial civilian casualties, 615 its proponents found
the alternative to be morally objectionable because it came un-
comfortably close to terrorizing citizens of opposing countries
and therefore blurred the sometimes obscure distinction be-
tween military and civilian targets. 1
57
III. MITCHELL AND RACE
Like most of his peers, Billy Mitchell was an unabashed white
supremacist. Unlike previous writers, Waller directly addresses
this aspect of Mitchell's life. Mitchell revealed his racism as the
youngest officer in the Army during the Spanish-American
War.1 58 He regarded the Cubans he encountered as little more
than children,159 referred to Filipinos in the most derogatory
terms, 16 and complained bitterly about the inferiority of Afri-
can-American soldiers. 61 His 1924 report on the state of Ameri-
can air defenses in the Pacific and potential military threats in
the Far East, in which he made his famous prediction of a Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor, dripped with concern for the fu-
ture of a white race imperiled by Asian peoples of color. 162
Another notable, and heretofore unremarked, racist episode
came half a dozen years after he resigned his commission follow-
154 See Lt. Col. Peter R. Faber, The Development of US Strategic Bombing Doctrine in
the Interwar Years: Moral and Legal?, 7 U.S.A.F. AcAD. J. LEGAL STUDIES 111, 114
(1997).
155 Id. at 115.
156 See id. at 116.
157 See id. at 115, 122.
158 Mitchell dropped out of college to enlist as a private at the age of 18. See
WALLER, supra note 8, at 70-71. Through the efforts of his father, a U.S. Senator
from Wisconsin, within a week of enlisting he was commissioned as a second
lieutenant. See id. at 71.
159 See id. at 75.
160 See id. at 78-79.
161 See id. at 58, 78.
162 See id. at 57. For details of the trip and the report, see id. at 54-57.
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ing his court-martial conviction. Mitchell retired to his 115-acre
estate in northern Virginia to raise horses and hunting dogs but
continued to speak out on aviation and defense issues and
hoped to secure a place in government.' 3 In January 1932 a
prominent society woman, with whom Mitchell was friendly, and
her maid were beaten to death. Mitchell, according to Waller,
was the first person to enter the house after the murders." 4
Early in 1933, a black man named George Crawford was arrested
in Massachusetts and reportedly confessed to the crimes.' 65 Vir-
ginia authorities sought to extradite him, but the NAACP en-
tered the case on Crawford's behalf.' The organization
persuaded a federal district judge in Boston to grant a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that blacks were systematically ex-
cluded from juries, a ruling that prompted outrage in Virginia.
Mitchell led the call for the judge's impeachment." 7 Privately,
he denounced the NAACP as subversive and opined that the
Massachusetts judge should be brought to Virginia and
lynched. "8
After the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
overturned the district judge's order because the jury-discrimi-
nation claim could not be raised in extradition proceedings,
Crawford was sent back for trial.'6 9 An all-black legal team
headed by Charles Hamilton Houston represented him on be-
half of the NAACP.' 0 Mitchell testified for the prosecution dur-
ing Crawford's trial for killing the society woman.' 7 ' Houston
soon developed doubts about Crawford's innocence, but he per-
163 See id. at 256, 340.
164 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 343.
165 Id.
166 Part of the reason for the NAACP's quick intervention on behalf of Craw-
ford was concern that the International Labor Defense, a left-wing group associ-
ated with the Communist Party that had taken control over the Scottsboro case,
would take over this one as well. See MAxPK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL
STRATEGX' AGAINST S GREGATED EDUCAION, 1925-1950 38, 40 (1987).
167 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 343. Nor was Mitchell alone. Southern mem-
bers of Congress also sought to impeach the judge. See MICHAEL J. KiURMXAN,
FROM JIM CROW 10 CIvIa RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUG;IE FOR
RACIAL EQuALrTY 127 (2004).
1613 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 343. He also reportedly remarked that Craw-
ford would have been lynched if he had been found immediately after the mur-
der. See id.
169 See Hale v. Crawford, 65 F.2d 739 (1st Cir. 1933) (holding that claims ofjury
discrimination had to be asserted in state court after Crawford was extradited).
170 See GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHAR Es HAMILTON HousTON AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RjGHrS 90-91 (1983); TUSHNET, supra note 166, at 41.
171 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 343.
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suaded the jury to spare the defendant's life after finding him
guilty. 172 Rather than risk a death penalty at a second trial,
Crawford pleaded guilty to killing the maid and received an-
other life sentence.1 7 3
IV. MITCHELL IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Billy Mitchell was neither the first nor the last prominent of-
ficer to get crosswise with his superiors. During the nineteenth
century, President Polk removed Army General-in-Chief Win-
field Scott from the field at the height of his Mexican War suc-
cess due to a long-simmering partisan conflict between a
Democratic chief executive and a Whig military leader. 174
About fifteen years later, President Lincoln relieved George B.
McClellan of command of the Union Army out of frustration
with the general's indecisive pursuit of Confederate forces.17 5
During the twentieth century, President Truman recalled Gen-
eral Douglas MacArthur in a highly charged policy dispute at a
crucial moment of the Korean War.176 A decade later, in 1961,
President Kennedy reassigned General Edwin Walker from a di-
visional command in West Germany to an administrative posi-
tion in Hawaii after Walker attacked the loyalty of President
172 See McNEIL, supra note 170, at 94; TUSHNET, supra note 166, at 41.
173 See McNEIL, supra note 170, at 94. Waller conflates the two trials, saying that
Crawford "eventually changed his plea to guilty and was sentenced to life in
prison." WALLER, supra note 8, at 343-44.
174 For details of Scott's removal and the background to the Polk-Scott conflict,
see JOHN S.D. EISENHOWER, AGENT OF DESTINY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF GENERAL
WINFIELD SCOTT 218-19, 221-25, 235-36, 309-14 (1997); CHARLES WINSLOW ELLI-
OTT, WINFIELD SCOTT: THE SOLDIER AND THE MAN 424-28, 439-41, 567-75 (1937);
TIMOTHY D. JOHNSON, WINFIELD SCOTT: THE QUEST FOR MILITARY GLORY 151-55,
158-60, 210-11 (1998); CHARLES A. McCoY, POLK AND THE PRESIDENCY 128-33
(1960).
175 SeeT. HARRY WILLIAMS, LINCOLN AND HIS GENERALS 156-78 (1952). For criti-
cal views of McClellan's generalship, see JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF
FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 358-65, 568-70 (1988); STEPHEN W. SEARS, GEORGE
B. MCCLELLAN: THE YOUNG NAPOLEON 338-39 (1988). For a more sympathetic
portrait, see WARREN W. HASSLER, JR., GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN: SHIELD OF
THE UNION 296-330 (1957).
176 See TRUMBULL HIGGINS, KOREA AND THE FALL OF MACARTHUR 103-52 (1960);
WILLIAM MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MAcARTHUR, 1880-1964 629-
77 (1978); RJCHARD H. ROVERE & ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE GENERAL AND
THE PRESIDENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 96-252 (1951); DEN-
NIS D. WAINSTOCK, TRUMAN, MACARTHUR, AND THE KOREAN WAR 121-41 (1999);
STANLEY WEINTRAUB, MACARTHUR'S WAR: KOREA AND THE UNDOING OF AN AMERI-
CAN HERO 315-56 (2000). MacArthur and Mitchell were boyhood acquaintances
who had maintained contact during their military careers, and MacArthur served
on the court-martial that tried Mitchell. See WALLER, supra note 8, at 49-50, 77.
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Truman, Eleanor Roosevelt, and other prominent officials and
tried to influence the votes of his troops. 177
Mitchell, however, was the only high officer to be tried by
court-martial as a result of his conflicts. 178 He sought vindica-
tion with the public and in politics. He went on lecture tours
and wrote articles for magazines and newspapers, although his
audiences and itineraries soon shrank.179 Meanwhile, he flirted
with the idea of running for U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, an
office his father had held thirty years earlier, and he angled for
the Democratic vice-presidential nomination in 1928, but
neither of these gambits went anywhere. 8 0 He also campaigned
for Al Smith that year and for Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 in
hopes of securing a high-level appointment, but that dream fiz-
zled as well. 8 '
Perhaps Mitchell was thinking about Scott and McClellan
when he resigned from the Army following his court-martial.
Both of them failed as presidential candidates but retained
much of their credibility long after their loss of command. Scott
got the 1852 Whig nomination for President but was trounced
by Franklin Pierce, who had served under him in Mexico.' 82
177 Rather than accept the reassignment, Walker resigned his commission and
later testified for two days before a Senate subcommittee about the activities that
got him into difficulty with the administration. WALTER LORD, THE PAST THAT
WOULD NOT DIE 180-81 (1965); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS:
JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 751 (1965); Military Cold War Education and
Speech Review Policies: Hearings Before the Special Preparedness Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1387-1534 (1962).
178 General Scott was the subject of an embarrassing court of inquiry but re-
mained on active duty. See EISENHOWER, supra note 174, at 315-20; ELLIOTT, supra
note 174, at 575-85, 588-89; JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 211-12.
179 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 333-36.
'80 See id. at 337-38. No one apparently questioned Mitchell's eligibility for the
vice presidency, although he had been born in France to American-citizen par-
ents who were temporarily living abroad. See id. at 64-65. Because he was born
overseas, there might have been some question about his status as a "natural born
Citizen," a constitutional requisite for eligibility for both the President and the
Vice President. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. amend. XII. A minor flap arose
over Michigan Governor George Romney's presidential eligibility because he had
been born in Mexico to American missionary parents. See Charles Gordon, Who
Can Be President of the United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REv. 1, 26-29
(1968); see also Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the
Under-Aged President, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250, 252-53 (1989). Romney's quest for
the Republican nomination failed for entirely unrelated reasons. See THEODORE
H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 54-61 (1969).
181 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 338-39.
182 See EISENHOWER, supra note 174, at 321-31; ELLIOTT, supra note 174, at 625-
46; JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 213-16.
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Nevertheless, he remained on active duty through the first year
of Lincoln's presidency.1 3 McClellan obtained the 1864 Demo-
cratic nomination but lost to Lincoln in the general election;18 4
he went on to serve effectively as governor of New Jersey.' 5
Maybe General Walker's post-military fade into obscurity in-
terrupted by a brief last hurrah comes closer to what happened
to Mitchell. Walker, having joined the John Birch Society in
1959, drifted deeper into far-right politics and bitterly de-
nounced efforts to desegregate the University of Mississippi in
1962.186 This came as a surprise to those who remembered that
he had won praise for his leadership of the federal troops Presi-
dent Eisenhower dispatched to Little Rock to enforce the deseg-
regation of Central High School in 1957.187 Walker went to the
Ole Miss campus at the height of the crisis over the admission of
James Meredith as the university's first African-American stu-
dent; while there, Walker became the subject of a news report
that he had incited and participated in violent resistance, and
he wound up as the losing plaintiff in a landmark libel case that
extended the New York Times actual-malice test to public
figures. 188
183 See EISENHOWER, supra note 174, at 331-98; ELLIOTT, supra note 174, at 647-
740; JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 217-33.
184 See SEARS, supra note 175, at 371-86.
185 See id. at 396-97.
186 See LoRD, supra note 177, at 180, 182-83.
187 See DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK, 101-02, 105, 127-29
(1962); see generally Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
188 See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The plurality opinion in
that case applies a somewhat lower standard of liability for public figures. See id.
at 155 (suggesting that a public figure may recover damages for defamation if the
substance of the statement at issue "makes substantial danger to reputation ap-
parent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered
to by responsible publishers"). The other five justices endorsed the New York
Times standard. See id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result); id. at 170
(Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 172 (Brennan,J.,joined by White, J., concurring in the result in part
and dissenting in part).
Walker's lawsuit arose from a wire service story that reported that he had at
one point taken command of an unruly crowd and had personally led a charge
against federal marshals. For the full text of that story, see Walker v. Associated
Press, 191 So. 2d 727, 731-32 n.2 (La. Ct. App. 1966), rev'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 28
(1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671, 672-74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1965), rev'd sub nom., Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
For accounts of Walker's involvement in the Ole Miss crisis, see NADINE
COHODAS, THE BAND PLAYED DIXIE: RACE AND THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE AT OLE
MISS 83-84, 86 (1997); LORD, supra note 177, at 183-84, 213-14, 215-17.
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Of course, Billy Mitchell was not Edwin Walker. Walker was a
political extremist obsessed by the specter of Communist subver-
sion everywhere, whereas Mitchell had grand visions about the
future of air power. He was ultimately done in by a combination
of factors. First, his abrasive personal style alienated many po-
tential supporters. Others who shared his views, some of them
disciples and passionate supporters, operated more discreetly
and survived to help implement many of Mitchell's
suggestions. "'
Second, he overpromised what the new technology could de-
liver. The problem was partly technical and partly logical. On
the technical side, aerial bombardment was not sufficiently de-
veloped to serve as the primary, let alone exclusive, basis for mil-
itary strategy. 90 Bombing accuracy has been a persistent
problem.'9 1 This technical difficulty was also related to the logi-
cal problem. Logically, the argument for bombing contained an
unresolved tension: proponents of aerial warfare believed that it
was possible to identify crucial targets that, when neutralized or
destroyed, would unravel an opposing nation's political, social,
and economic structure; but the potentially catastrophic impact
of bombing assumed that societies and nations were complex
and interrelated networks.'92 Of course, if societies or nations
are interdependent, it is difficult to pinpoint crucial targets that
hold them together. On the other hand, if promising targets
can be singled out, perhaps their destruction will have more dis-
crete effects. This is not an argument against bombing, but it
does suggest some inherent limitations of a strategy that relies
too heavily on aerial attacks. Indeed, this logical tension might
help to explain why it remains impossible for air power alone to
win a war.'93-
Third, Mitchell suffered from bad timing. He argued for a
whole new approach to defense policy at a time when the
United States faced little immediate military threat, indeed dur-
ing a period when the nation apparently was seeking a return to
189 See SHERRY, supra note 84, at 36; WALLER, supra note 8, at 359.
19) See HURLEY, supra note 82, at 112; SHERRY, supra note 84, at 36, 52.
191 See, e.g., SHERRY, supra note 84, at 55-56, 162, 262; Canestaro, supra note 109,
at 445-47, 451.
92 See SHERRY, supra note 84, at 56.
193 See Max Boot, The New Ametican Way of War, FOREICN AFF., July-Aug. 2003, at
41, 55.
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normalcy after the Great War. Neither policy makers nor the
public felt any great urgency about the situation.'94
Finally, Mitchell faced a shrewd adversary in the frequently
underestimated President Coolidge. Silent Cal was an implaca-
ble foe of unnecessary government spending, which made him
reluctant to endorse potentially budget-busting projects, no mat-
ter how promising they might appear.19 5 Beyond his commit-
ment to fiscal responsibility, Coolidge had a strong conception
of presidential authority and therefore took a dim view of those
who went outside executive branch channels. 9 ' In this regard,
he differed markedly from his predecessor, President Harding,
who had given Mitchell and other advocates of air power a wider
berth in which to operate.' 97 Coolidge also had an excellent
strategic sense. He wanted Mitchell out of the Army but did not
want to create a martyr by having the brash aviation advocate
formally dismissed from the service. The chief executive there-
fore took a calculated risk by setting in motion the process that
led to the court-martial. 198 After the verdict, he reduced the se-
verity of the tribunal's sanction from five years without pay and
allowances to five years at half pay. 99 Even the reduced sanc-
tion led Mitchell to resign, as Coolidge suspected he would.2 0 0
And, as Coolidge also accurately surmised, Mitchell would lose
much of his luster with the public after he quit the military.21
The biggest lesson for lawyers in the Mitchell affair could be
the tortoise-hare story of a supposedly phlegmatic chief execu-
tive outmaneuvering a charismatic and flamboyant military of-
ficer. That Coolidge managed to achieve his goal of getting rid
of Mitchell without having to exercise the formal powers of his
office in a visible way might have implications for the continuing
debate over the president's power to remove civilian officials.
For all the impassioned defenses of the unitary executive,20 2 in
the real world presidents have found more subtle ways than out-
194 See SHERRY, supra note 84, at 37, 53.
195 See HURLEY, supra note 82, at 99-100; SHERRY, supra note 84, at 37.
196 See HURLEY, supra note 82, at 85, 91.
197 See id. at 85.
198 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 30-31, 41, 85.
-9 See id. at 324, 330.
200 See HURLEY, supra note 82, at 107.
201 See WALLER, supra note 8, at 334. Although matters played out as Coolidge
anticipated, the Army came to have second thoughts about the wisdom of the
Mitchell court-martial. See Kester, supra note 74, at 1733 n.225.
202 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); see also Morrison v. Ol-
son, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steven G. Calabresi &
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right dismissal to rid themselves of unwanted personnel.2 °3 Per-
haps, therefore, the argument about removal is actually about
something else.2" 4 That, however, is a story for another day.
Unlike other high-profile cases such as those involving Sam
Sheppard, Leo Frank, and the so-called Scottsboro boys, the
Billy Mitchell case did not result in a landmark Supreme Court
decision. Perhaps, for that reason, Mitchell's court-martial re-
tains symbolic significance for the general public rather than
historical significance for lawyers and legal scholars. As we have
seen, however, the Mitchell affair posed some fascinating ques-
tions of constitutional and international law. Moreover, Mitch-
ell himself played a notable and not altogether positive role in
an early civil rights case that helped launch the NAACP's litiga-
tion campaign against racial discrimination. Although Waller
does not address these issues in much detail, his engrossing ac-
count of Mitchell's court-martial, military career and personal
life has resonance for contemporary legal and political issues.
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws., 104 YALE L.J. 541
(1994).
203 SeeJonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Sub-
stance, and Administrative Independence, 75 Ky. LJ. 699, 779-80 (1987).
204 See, e.g.,Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as
Symbol, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1595 (1997); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administra-
tion, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
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